'Powers' offers global insights

  • Posted: Sunday, March 8, 2009 12:01 a.m.
    UPDATED: Monday, March 19, 2012 8:49 a.m.
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GREAT POWERS: America and the World After Bush. By Thomas P.M. Barnett. Putnam. 496 pages. $29.95.

As one of the most insightful diagnoses of the post-9/11 international system, "The Pentagon's New Map" (2004) became a must-read for military brass and foreign policymakers the world over. Building on that book and "Blueprint for Action" (2006), "Great Powers" is grand strategist Thomas P.M. Barnett's prolific yet user-friendly guidebook of best practices for policymakers hoping to reassert America's leadership role in the post-Bush-Cheney era.

Probably inspired by the writings of Francis Fukuyama, the notion that the question of identity will be a root cause of future conflicts is a key feature of Barnett's forecasts in "Great Powers." According to Barnett, the forces of globalization increasingly will ignite crises fueled by that question within the "Gap." The "Gap" is trademark Barnett-speak for states at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of social, political and economic development from nations such as the U.S. and members of the European Union, which, also in Barnett-speak, are part of the globe's "Functioning Core."

Barnett leaves few considerations untouched as he persuasively purveys his argument that in our "flat," post-9/11 world the U.S., working with, not against, the global community, must focus on reconnecting both economies and societies from the Gap with the Core. For Barnett, this is the surest path to take if we are to silence the polyphonic chorus of anti-globalization and religious extremism that loudly targeted America on 9/11.

So what is needed to achieve this? As Barnett sees it, the U.S. should reshuffle its deck by establishing entities such as the DoEE (Department of Everything Else). He explains DoEE should function similarly to the U.S. Agency for International Development before it was enveloped by the Department of State but with both broader operational capabilities and a mandate to transition so-called Gap states into members of the Core. Barnett's list of other action items is vast. Wittily, he even includes a 12-step recovery program from what he sees as various failed Bush-Cheney foreign policy directives. Fortunately, when it comes to charting a new course for America's grand strategy, as Barnett puts it, "Time is on our side."

If Carl von Clausewitz, Fukuyama, Thomas Friedman, Samuel Huntington, Lt. Col. John Nagl, Henry Kissinger and Stephen Colbert were enjoying a few drams of whisky while discussing how the U.S. should respond to major issues confronting the Core, one imagines a transcript of their conversations would closely parallel the text of Barnett's latest work.

"Great Powers" leaves little room to wonder why Barnett has become one of the most influential thought-leaders in America's defense and intelligence communities today. One can only hope the powers that be in D.C. are paying close attention to the suggestions put forth in his latest work. It is guaranteed to be one of the most important books of its kind published in 2009.