Report: firefighters were inadequately trained and exposed to excessive risk

A Charleston Fire Department over-confident in its ability to aggressively extinguish fires and totally lacking in modern tactics and equipment and a sprawling furniture store in violation of fire and building codes proved a deadly combination at the June 18 Sofa Super Store fire, according to a report from a city-appointed panel of firefighting experts.

Insufficient training, inadequate staffing, obsolete equipment and outdated tactics contributed to an ineffective response and effort to control the June 18 fire in its early stages, the 272-page report stated.

The department's time-tested, one-size-fits-all expertise at battling fires in downtown Charleston's historic homes and buildings was no match for a raging blaze at a massive suburban furniture outlet, constructed in piecemeal of man-made materials and stuffed full of flammable couches.

"The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices," according to the report from the six-member panel. "The strategy and tactics attempted by Department members were inappropriate for the situation and exposed the firefighters to extreme and unnecessary risks."

Charleston Mayor Joe Riley said there was no connection between Chief Rusty Thomas' announcement Wednesday of his decision to retire June 27 and the report's findings. But some experts say the report is so damning that they have no doubt it influenced Thomas's abrupt announcement. The panel pointed to command failures and undersized water hoses as predominant factors in the fire department's "unstructured and uncoordinated" response to the blaze.

The report provides a comprehensive and frank account of a fast-moving trash fire that spiraled into a raging inferno, warped steel and sent the roof crashing down on firefighters within 40 minutes of the first 911 call. The suspected cause of the fire was the careless disposal of "smoking materials" near a heap of discarded furniture, packaging materials and highly flammable solvents that the store was not permitted to stockpile.

The report describes a chaotic scene in which firefighters charged into the building with no clear strategy for how to attack an intense fire that they were completely unprepared to fight. The report concludes that the immensity of the fire and sheer volume of flammable materials demanded that firefighters back away and battle the blaze defensively from outside the building with aerial ladders and other resources.

The department's command system was virtually nonexistent, leaving firefighters without supervision or clear instructions and leaving commanders with no idea of who was where and what they were doing. Key tasks were left undone and life-saving posts were never established in the rush to funnel as many people inside as possible.

"The predominant factor identified in the analysis of Fire Department operations is the failure to manage the incident according to accepted practices," the report states. "There was no structured incident command system in place and the essential duties of an Incident Commander were not performed. The operation was conducted in an unstructured and uncoordinated manner, without overall direction and with inadequate supervision. The Charleston Fire Department was inadequately staffed, inadequately trained, insufficiently equipped, and organizationally unprepared to conduct an operation of this complexity in a large commercial occupancy."

The report also contains new details about the earliest minutes of the fire. Alerted by a passer-by that a fire had broken out at the back of the building, a store employee grabbed a fire extinguisher and trained it on a small fire near the loading dock. He ran back into the store for a second extinguisher, but by the time he returned, the smoke had overtaken the loading dock and moved inside the building.

The first crews of firefighters began arriving at about that same moment, the report says.

Thomas was not the initial commander on the scene the night of the fire. He arrived as the blaze was beginning to spread into the store and before the first distress calls were made from firefighters lost or trapped inside. But both he and Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin failed to follow nationally recognized standards that call for commanders to stay put so they can monitor changing fire conditions and coordinate manpower and equipment. Instead, they were all over the place, barking orders and inserting themselves in front-line operations. This left no one with an outside overview of the rapidly changing conditions as the store filled with superheated smoke and toxic vapors needing only fresh oxygen to erupt.

The report says fire commanders did not hear pleas for help from firefighters who were lost in the store's maze-like layout, running out of air and struggling to navigate through coal-black smoke and super-heated air. Fragmented communications from lost and disoriented firefighters continued for approximately seven minutes.

Fallen firefighter Melvin Champaign called for help over his radio numerous times from inside the store.

"We need some help," he pleaded. "Can you hear me, dispatcher?"

A moment later, he prays. "In Jesus' name, Amen."

No one responded to his calls.

"The radio messages indicating that firefighters were in distress were not heard by anyone at the incident scene..." the report says.

Champaign's cousin, Carl Champaign, was devastated after learning of his relative's desperate, unanswered calls for help. "Right now, my heart is broke."

The department did not adhere to accepted radio communication protocols designed to provide orderly commands and instructions and to ensure that "mayday" calls from firefighters are heard and immediately acted upon, the consultants found. "The communications process was not controlled. The Fire Chief, the Assistant Chief, and Battalion Chief 4 were all issuing orders and providing direction independently, using a single overloaded radio channel. Critical messages, including distress message from firefighters inside of the structure, were not heard."

Randy Hutchinson, a former Charleston firefighter who lost his brother, Capt. Billy Hutchinson, in the fire, said the report underscores problems that were known early on but few wanted to talk about, namely the failure of commanders to effectively manage the scene. "It definitely points out there was no command structure whatsoever at the fire. Period."

The department's policy at the time of allowing firefighters' air tanks to be only partially filled left some firefighters inside the store running out of air in as little as 12 or 13 minutes, according to the city-appointed panel. As a choking blanket of smoke filled the showroom, frantic firefighters scrambled to find a way out before their air tanks ran dry. One firefighter described how his comrades collided with him in the rush to escape. One desperate firefighter even crawled between his legs.

At least 16 firefighters were inside at the time. But Thomas was unaware of this "critical situation" inside the showroom until an off-duty battalion chief arrived and told him about the distress calls. Thomas didn't have an overall grasp of the operation and had assumed things were going well: that Garvin was "conducting a successful operation to keep fire from extending into the showrooms."

As conditions worsened, Thomas, and later Garvin, ordered firefighters to smash the front showroom windows to clear away smoke and help the men inside, witnesses told the panel. That action had almost immediate consequences.

"There is ample evidence that breaking the windows provided air to the fire and accelerated the ignition of the showroom contents," the report stated. "The windows were broken at approximately 19:35 (7:35 p.m.) and the interior of the main showroom became fully involved within three to four minutes."

The panel stated that breaking the windows likely accelerated the flashover that occurred. However, they noted that there were very few viable options at that point. "If the windows had not been broken, the atmosphere probably would have become ripe for a backdraft to occur within a short time," the report stated.

Neither Thomas nor Garvin recalled giving orders to break the windows, the report stated. But St. Andrews firefighter Steven Beasley told The Post and Courier this week that he clearly recalls Thomas giving the order to smash out the glass spanning the front of the store. "That's not the way you are supposed to do it, but (Thomas) was the incident commander. He's the one who calls the shots."

Moments later, Beasley and fellow St. Andrews firefighter Daniel Bilton entered the store in one last-ditch effort to rescue downed firefighters. They managed to get hold of at least one firefighter just inside the showroom.

But the air rushing in through the broken windows fed the hungry flames and a ball of fire shot through the store, thrusting Beasley and Bilton back outside and causing them to lose their grip on the firefighter. Hours later, recovery crews would find the bodies of fallen firefighters James "Earl" Drayton and Brad Baity, just a short distance from the front doors.

Families of the fallen firefighters were briefed on the report Thursday morning, followed by presentations for firefighters later in the day. Family members filed into the Gaillard Auditorium for the panel's 2 p.m. presentation. Within 20 minutes, some had heard enough and left the auditorium. Outside, family members hugged, smoked cigarettes and tried to make sense of the overwhelming report.

Most said they did not want to talk. Those who did expressed continued support for Thomas and said the report makes it clear that much of the tragedy was out of the chief's hands.

Holly Gildea, daughter of fallen fighter Capt. Mike Benke, said she was saddened by the report, particularly the problems firefighters ran into with lack of water and running out of air in their tanks.

But she said Thomas should not shoulder all the blame; there is plenty to go around. "We can't point our finger at Rusty. It was not all him. It was such a mixture of things. I wish him all the best. He has his own nightmare as well as us."

The report paints a picture of the sofa store as a time bomb waiting to be lit. It describes the sofa store as a deathtrap, identifying its dense layout of furniture, padlocked doors and poorly maintained or identified exits. "The inadequate number of exits, locked exits, and obstructed paths to exits significantly reduced the potential for firefighters who were inside the showroom buildings to find a path to safety."

"The fire could have been prevented. If the property had been constructed and maintained in accordance with state and local codes the fire would have been quickly controlled: no lives would have been lost and the fire would have been of little consequence," according to the report.

Jean Dangerfield, sister of fallen firefighter Michael French, said the numerous violations at the store highlighted in the report should not go unnoticed. Building owners need to ensure their properties are safe and up to code "so these guys aren't walking in on a suicide mission."